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In the aftermath of World War II, the United States, guided by liberal 
internationalist principles, sought—successfully—to knit together a 
“free world” of allied powers that interacted with each other in a coop-
erative, rules- and institution-based way. This made intra-Western in-
ternational politics a series of positive sum interactions that allowed us 
to contain and out-compete our communist adversaries. At the same 
time, a universalistic United Nations was, despite Cold War tensions, 
able to do some important humanitarian and peacekeeping work and 
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help further the idea that even superpower competition should be con-
ducted with some restraint.1  
INTRODUCTION 
o international legal document trumps the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (“UDHR”) in the breadth of its expectations.2 
None could be faulted for being more vague as to how its expectations 
are to be fulfilled. In adopting the document in 1948, the United Nations 
(“UN”) General Assembly proclaimed the broad collection of rights to be 
“a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”3 
This proclamation measured the aspirations of the document against its 
limitations. The process and form by which it came into existence as well 
as its substantive contents suggested the incoherence and dissonance that 
are its enduring legacy. 
The first article of the UDHR obligates all human beings to “act to-
wards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” based on the simple and 
quite mystical assertion that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights” and are “endowed with reason and conscience.” 4 
The document proceeds in another twenty-nine articles to identify a 
comprehensive set of obligations or claims upon society presented as 
rights belonging to every human being.5 Yet, despite its dire warnings 
about the horrific consequences of a culture of “disregard and contempt” 
for human rights and of a failure to protect human rights by the rule of 
law, the document and subsequent documents building upon the UDHR’s 
mandate have not had identifiable impact on the structures of violence 
and misery that continue to plague humanity.6 
More than sixty years after the adoption of this venerated document, its 
place in the timeless universal struggle for human dignity is still secure 
                                                                                                             
 1. Matt Yglesias, Debating Liberal Internationalism, AM. PROSPECT (May 15, 
2008), http://prospect.org/article/debating-liberal-internationalism#yglesias. 
 2. On Dec. 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations (“UN”) adopted 
and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 3. See id. at 71–72 & pmbl. 
 4. Id. art. 1. 
 5. Id. The UDHR is composed of thirty articles in addition to the Preamble. Article 
29 deviates from the first twenty-eight articles by bringing up the notion of individual 
duties to the community and discussing in broad terms permissible limitations upon the 
rights outlined earlier. Article 30 is also a limitation of sorts against the possibility of 
rights discourse itself being employed to destroy rights and freedoms. Id. 
 6. Id. at 71–72 & pmbl. 
N
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enough to be celebrated around the world.7 The UDHR is accepted by 
many as the anchor of all subsequent elaboration of human rights stand-
ards.8 It is the foundation of a so-called international bill of rights and an 
enduring synthesis of centuries-long efforts to define and broaden our 
understanding of what human dignity means and how it should be nur-
tured.9 The UDHR continues also to play an inspirational role in the 
struggles of many who have to face tyrannical governments or intolera-
ble human deprivations.10 
However, in the midst of this celebration, the limits of what was 
achieved in Paris in the fall of 1948 ought to be acknowledged even if 
only to get a better sense of the possibilities and challenges facing the 
human dignity movement. This acknowledgement should begin with an 
understanding of its deeply political role as a project of liberal interna-
tionalism that skillfully employed the language of law to obscure its 
main function of preserving Western power and privileges.11 
                                                                                                             
 7. See Declaration on the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, G.A. Res. 63/116, at 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/116 (Feb. 26, 2009). The 
UN, as well as various international, regional, governmental, and non-governmental bod-
ies, including educational institutions, regularly observe the anniversary of this docu-
ment. See, for example: 
On 10 December (2008), Human Rights Day, the Secretary-General launched a 
year-long campaign in which all parts of the United Nations family are taking 
part in the lead up to the 60th birthday of the . . . [UDHR] on Human Rights 
Day 2008. With more than 360 language versions to help them, U.N. organiza-
tions around the globe are using the year to focus on helping people every-
where to learn about their human rights. The UDHR was the first international 
recognition that all human beings have fundamental rights and freedoms and it 
continues to be a living and relevant document today. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 1948–2008, UN.ORG, 
http://www.un.org/events/humanrights/udhr60/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2012); see also Dalai 
Lama, Message on the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
OFFICE OF HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA (Dec. 7, 1998), 
http://www.dalailama.com/messages/world-peace/universal-declaration. 
 8. See LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 205–08 (2007) [herein-
after HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS] ; see also HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 133 (3d ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter STEINER ET AL.]. 
 9. See HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 205–08. 
 10. See Amartya Sen, The Power of a Declaration, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 4, 2009, 
12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/books/the-power-declaration. 
 11. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 164–84 (2005) on the broader issue of the role of international law in the rhetoric of 
international relations. They argue that “international law emerges from states acting 
rationally to maximize their interests, given their perceptions of the interests of other 
states and the distribution of state power.” Id. at 3. Their arguments point the way toward 
410 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:2 
A product of intensive, even painstaking negotiations among a sam-
pling of westernized transnational elites of the time, the document was 
deliberately characterized as a declaration, a term that evokes all the so-
lemnity and pomp of binding international obligations but none of its 
substantive legal force.12 Its contents were offered as standards by which 
individuals and governmental authorities were to be judged henceforth 
even as those standards were described, without any hint of irony, as if 
they reflected current practices in many jurisdictions.13 The deception in 
terms of purpose and expectations, as well as unresolved tensions, be-
tween what was real and what was aspirational were forever locked in 
the document.14 Such are the consequences of political negotiations 
among unequals at a time of heightened global insecurity and the diffi-
culties of trying to “concretize” rules designed to restrain power and 
politics under the cloak of legality.15 
This Article examines the legacy of the rights scheme begun with this 
venerated document, now well into its sixth decade of existence, in terms 
of its continuing utility as a moral, political, and legal instrument in on-
going struggles to promote human dignity and reduce misery. For its 
proponents, the UDHR and its progenies16 have served two primary func-
tions: firstly, to memorialize the timeless struggle for human freedom 
from communal oppression and secondly, to provide general directions 
toward a better life for human beings as individuals and as members of 
                                                                                                             
an understanding that would put human rights within an appropriately limited perspective 
as argued in this article. 
 12. See HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 204; HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 414–15 (1968) (“Undoubtedly, 
the Declaration will occasionally be invoked by private and official bodies, including the 
organs of the United Nations. But it will not—and cannot—properly be invoked as a 
source of legal obligation.”). 
 13. The drafters employed the language of “reaffirming” faith in fundamental human 
rights at a time when all the parties around the table had troubling records of human 
rights violations, from slavery and racial discrimination in the United States, to colonial-
ism among all the major powers, to pogroms and genocidal behavior by many others, and 
to the widespread oppression of women. The question that arises then is where does the 
faith they are reaffirming come from? Certainly not from the practice of nations. Eleanor 
Roosevelt and others defending the drafters’ approach, focused on the document’s role as 
an educational or inspirational document. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE 
NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 235–
37 (2001) [hereinafter GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW]. 
 14. See HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 208. 
 15. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5 (1991). 
 16. The term “progenies” is employed in this article to refer to the several core inter-
national human rights agreements that were developed after the UDHR to flesh out its 
provisions. Specifically, it refers to the two covenants, the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
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diverse communities across the globe.17 Some might contend that merely 
by its creation, the UDHR succeeded in terms of its first function even if 
it has had, at best, mixed results in terms of the latter.18 However, this 
Article argues that UDHR and its progenies should be understood pri-
marily as a key project of liberal internationalism19 in the immediate 
                                                                                                             
 17. See Sen, supra note 10. 
 18. See HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 205 (“The Universal Dec-
laration crystallized 150 years of struggle for rights.”). 
 19. Liberal internationalism offers a positive and benign interpretation of its aims, to 
wit that through the perpetuation and support of liberalism, the likelihood of international 
conflict is reduced and the international order is protected. To achieve this goal, liberal-
ism must thrive at the national and international levels. At the national level, liberal insti-
tutions decrease a nation’s willingness to engage in acts of war through increased equali-
ty and constitutional protections, citizen involvement in government, legal protections of 
property, and market economies. This goal is achieved internationally through the crea-
tion of multinational cosmopolitan agreements and cooperative international organiza-
tions. The promotion of liberal institutions on these levels decreases the likelihood of 
international conflict, particularly between liberal states, and increases the stability on a 
global level, arguably, for the ultimate good. This theory has been championed by leaders 
such as Theodore Roosevelt who argued that it is the duty of liberal states to promote and 
protect peace, by force if necessary. Other important proponents include Woodrow Wil-
son and Franklin Roosevelt. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 
33–73 (1990). See generally Michael Lind, For Liberal Internationalism, NATION (June 
14, 2007), 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/liberal_internationalism_5538. 
Lind distinguishes various tendencies within the liberal internationalist camp, identifying 
“democratic hegemonists” and “liberal imperialists” as two groups of “heretics” who 
threaten the legacy of “historic American liberal” internationalism. Lind, supra. Accord-
ing to Lind, 
[G]enuine liberal internationalism . . . is neither a naïve idealism that ignores 
the realities of power nor a crude realism that ignores the power of ideals. 
While universal liberalism and universal democracy are its ultimate goals, the 
practical and immediate goal has been global peace. Enduring international 
peace is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for liberal democracy. 
Why? In a world of recurring great-power conflicts or widespread anarchy, 
concerns about security may force even liberal democracies to sacrifice their 
freedoms to the imperatives of self-defense. This is what Woodrow Wilson 
meant when he said that the United States and its allies must make the world 
“safe for democracy.” A world safe for democracy need not be a democratic 
world. It need only be a world in which democracies like the United States are 
not forced by recurrent world wars to turn themselves into armed camps. 
Id.; see also Anne-Marie Burley, Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism 
and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1914–28 (1992); Michael W. 
Doyle, Liberal Internationalism: Peace, War, and Democracy, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (June 
22, 2004), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/articles/doyle/; Yglesias, supra note 
1. 
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post-World War II period whose main purpose was to constrain the na-
ture of future challenges to the global order emerging after the carnage 
and dissonance of the period.20 The laudable inspirational and substan-
tive ideals contained in the document were not ends as such. They were a 
means toward another end rooted in Western pragmatic self-interest.21 
As a critical piece of the project, the UDHR helped to define in ideo-
logical terms the period that followed the end of World War II, marking 
the beginning of a time of intense competition over the creation of a new 
world order.22 The rights contained in the document that were further 
developed in subsequent similar forms helped to secure the project and 
its patrons from radical political challenges.23 As Stanley Hoffman has 
observed: 
A situation of dependence or of superiority that is just a fact of life can 
be reversed through political action, but once it is solemnly cast in legal 
form, the risks of action designed to change the situation are much 
higher: law is a form of policy that changes the stakes, and often “esca-
lates” the intensity, of political contests; it is a constraint comparable to 
force in effects.24 
                                                                                                             
 20. This argument should be distinguished from the charge, rooted in the dispute over 
universalism and cultural relativism, that much of the substance of human rights derive 
from the western liberal tradition and as such are “inappropriate and inapplicable to their 
circumstances.” STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 512. This article does not engage that 
argument. The focus here is the channeling of emancipatory possibilities into the straight 
jacket of human rights regimentation. See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: 
REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 18–31 (2004) [hereinafter KENNEDY, 
THE DARK SIDES] (discussing how human rights is limited by its relationship to western 
liberalism). Unlike Kennedy, this Article addresses how the implementers of this project 
could be more effective in their tasks. 
 21. This Article argues that the fundamental end was maintaining western values, 
interests, or supremacy in the wake of post World War II challenges. See Chandra Muzaf-
far, On Western Imperialism and Human Rights (“From Human Rights to Human Digni-
ty,” 1999), in THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER: MAJOR POLITICAL ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND 
DOCUMENTS FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT 414–18 (Micheline R. Ishay ed., 2d 
ed. 2007) [hereinafter THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER]; see also Makau W. Mutua, The 
Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 589, 646–52 (1996) [hereinafter Mutua, 
Ideology of Human Rights]. 
 22. Hardt and Negri see the UN as a critical component in post-World War II strug-
gles over international order, culminating in a post-imperial global order where no nation 
is dominant but where transformational change is effectively suspended—the end of his-
tory. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 4–19 (2000); see also MOYNIHAN, 
supra note 19, at 73–119. 
 23. See Muzaffar, supra note 21, at 416. 
 24. Stanley Hoffmann, The Study of International Law and the Theory of Internation-
al Relations, 57 PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. 26, 34 (1963). 
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The success of this liberal international project can thus not be judged 
from the lofty rhetoric and veneration of human rights evangelists, but 
from the rigid maintenance of global socio-political hierarchy over the 
past decades with little change in the quality of life experience for the 
least of us and the reality of mass violence for all. Rights evangelization 
and regimentation channeled productive energies into carefully bordered 
channels of thinking and activities that have, in the main, protected the 
fundamental aspects of the status quo.25 
An appreciation of its functional origin as a project of liberal interna-
tionalism allows us to respond more effectively to the many who uncriti-
cally extol the UDHR’s contributions over the past sixty plus years or 
explain its inadequacies with yet more initiatives to realize its fading 
promise to defend the dignity of every human being without reservations 
or limitations.26 In particular, an examination of the decided inability of 
this enterprise to affect the vast category of economic and social relation-
ships within and across nations is crucial.27 As part of this effort, this 
Article looks critically at the recent move from rights talk to “goals” in 
the Millennium Development Goals (“MDG”) exercise.28 The overall 
task has been made more urgent by the extraordinary destruction of 
wealth within and across national borders that has accompanied the cur-
rent global economic crisis.29 The goal here is not merely a reaffirmation 
                                                                                                             
 25. Chantal Mouffe makes the point that “democratic politics must accept division 
and conflict as unavoidable, and reconciliation of rival claims and conflicting interests 
can only be partial and provisional.” Chantal Mouffe, Radical Democracy or Liberal 
Democracy, in RADICAL DEMOCRACY: IDENTITY, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE STATE 19–26 
(David Trend ed., 1996). This must also be true about global politics. Efforts to impose 
an end to history appear in many guises and require the same level of commitment from 
those who want to preserve possibilities. See also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF 
HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 55–69 (1992). 
 26. The proliferation of human rights nongovernmental organizations and human 
rights programs within educational institutions testify to this phenomenon. 
 27. See JEANNE WOODS & HOPE LEWIS, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE GLOBAL 
MARKETPLACE: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 3–42 (2005) (discussing 
various human rights global narratives and themes in the global marketplace). 
 28. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 
(Sept. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Millennium Declaration]. 
 29. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, World Bank Says Global Economy Will Shrink in 
‘09, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/business/09bank.html (“The bank said that develop-
ing countries, many of which had been growing rapidly in recent years, are being devas-
tated by plunging exports, falling commodity prices, declining foreign investment and 
vanishing credit.”); Peter Eavis, For Europe, Few Options In A Vicious Cycle of Debt, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/for-europe-few-
options-in-a-vicious-cycle-of-debt/; Larry Elliott, Global Financial Crisis: Five Key 
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of realist skepticism about law’s capacity to challenge power.30 Rather, 
the goal here is to undermine the insanity behind happy-talk and expose 
the huge gap between such free floating rhetoric and harsh reality of eve-
ryday life for much of humanity. With humility, the Article urges a 
pragmatic reassessment of how we have confronted the enormous ine-
qualities, violence, and misery that continue to plague our world. 
There is much to be said for documenting humanity’s long struggle to 
affirm the dignity of each individual.31 There can hardly be a project 
more worthy of our collective endeavors. The process of identifying and 
defining the components of what makes us human, captured by the 
UDHR and its progenies, is undeniably a necessary step in our evolu-
tion.32 Carried out honestly, these efforts to identify, define, and docu-
ment should have significant lessons for more radical approaches to con-
fronting inequality and abuses of power throughout the world. The heg-
emonic vision of liberal internationalists should not undermine or dis-
credit this work. However, the limits of rights evangelization and regi-
mentation must be understood in order to free the human spirit to do 
more to end misery and violence by other means consistent with human 
dignity. 
I. GIVING DUE CREDIT: CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE UDHR  
Even though its primary function as a project of liberal international-
ism was to preserve the privileges of Western society, the UDHR and its 
progenies did make worthwhile contributions to the cause of reducing 
human misery through some of the rights rhetoric that it ushered. The 
simple act of making human rights an arena of legitimate struggle fo-
cused more attention and scrutiny on the human condition as opposed to 
the needs of the state.33 Two specific important contributions in this re-
gard were the promotion of a universal discourse on rights as a counter-
force to state power, and support for the development of mechanisms and 
processes that would reduce violence and misery.34 While these contribu-
tions should not be exaggerated, they should not be dismissed. 
                                                                                                             
Stages 2007–2011, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/aug/07/global-financial-crisis-key-stages. 
 30. See generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 11, at 167–84 (arguing that 
many global problems cannot be solved by a reliance on international law because states 
act predominantly in their interests). 
 31. See HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 205. 
 32. See Muzaffar, supra note 21, at 414–15. 
 33. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 12, at 61–62. 
 34. See Henry J. Steiner, Securing Human Rights: The First Half-Century of the Uni-
versal Declaration, and Beyond, HARV. MAG., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 45. 
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A. Rights Discourse & Standard-Setting 
As Professor Lynn Hunt puts it, “the Universal Declaration crystallized 
150 years of struggle for rights.”35 The UDHR was the first systematic 
expression of human rights in the most universal context.36 Various na-
tional constitutions and laws had already established, defended, or pro-
moted conceptions of human rights in limited geographic or other cate-
gorical manners. In the United States, the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the United States Constitution did not apply to broad seg-
ments of the populations until a civil war, subsequent amendments, legis-
lation, and rights struggles forced a more expansive national vision.37 In 
France, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen led to a period 
of expansive interpretations of rights in France and its colonies,38 but the 
subsequent reign of terror created a substantial backlash.39 The Magna 
Carta and the English Bill of Rights were also essential antecedents.40 
But it was the UDHR, coming in the aftermath of a global conflict of 
extraordinary lethality and scope that ought to be credited with the 
                                                                                                             
 35. HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 205. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. The first ten 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution, called the Bill of Rights, outlined classic human 
rights protections, such as free speech and religious autonomy (First Amendment), pro-
tection against unreasonable search and seizure (Fourth Amendment), due process, dou-
ble jeopardy, and self incrimination (Fifth Amendment), and right to counsel in criminal 
cases (Sixth Amendment). U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, V, VI. Many other core protections 
came after the American civil war such as abolition of slavery (Thirteenth Amendment), 
equal protection of the laws (Fourteenth Amendment), and voting rights for African 
Americans (Fifteenth Amendment). U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV; see also HUNT, 
INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 15–19. 
 38. See The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), reprinted in 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER, supra note 21, at 490–91; see also HUNT, INVENTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 15–26, 126–75. The French Declaration led to signifi-
cant acceptance of equality for racial and minorities as well as women. Id. 
 39. The reign of terror in France (1793–94) marked a period during the French Revo-
lution when rival political factions in a struggle for power turned against each other vio-
lently, leading to widespread violence including mass executions. See also LYNN HUNT, 
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND CLASS IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 46–51 (1984) [hereinafter 
HUNT, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND CLASS]; SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION 767–92 (1989). 
 40. See Magna Carta (1215) and The English Bill of Rights (1689), reprinted in THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS READER, supra note 21, at 483–87; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human 
Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protec-
tions and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
235, 254 (1993); Mary Ann Glendon, John P. Humphrey and the Drafting of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, 2 J. HIST. INT’L L. 250, 254 (2000) [hereinafter Glen-
don, Drafting of the UDHR]. 
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broadest mass marketing approach to the concept of rights. It sought 
nothing less than to broaden the expectations of these instruments to all 
of humanity defined without limitations or reservations.41 Following ar-
guments outlined by President Franklin Roosevelt in his “Four Free-
doms” address to the U.S. Congress in 1941,42 the UDHR asserted broad-
ly that human rights were “the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace 
in the world.”43 As such both peace between nations and progress within 
nations were linked inextricably to the recognition and promotion of hu-
man rights.44 Without human rights, oppressed or necessitous people 
would rise to challenge their governments.45 Civilization or human pro-
gress was thus linked; human rights culture, established. In other words, 
societies that fail to establish and defend human rights would not be con-
sidered civilized and would not succeed. The complex relationship be-
tween power and human rights was thus presented, albeit not fully devel-
oped, but enough to allow assertions of power to be subject henceforth to 
critical examination on an additional plane for legitimacy.46 That this 
sleight of hand erased centuries of brutal reality was left for another 
day.47 
In keeping with Roosevelt’s theme, the UDHR recognized the intimate 
connections between civil and political violations on the one hand and 
economic and social violations on the other.48 As Mary Ann Glendon 
puts it, “One of the most basic assumptions of the founders of the UN 
                                                                                                             
 41. See generally Glendon, Drafting of the UDHR, supra note 40, at 254; STEINER ET 
AL., supra note 8, at 134–39; Sen, supra note 10. 
 42. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 6, 1941), in 
87 CONG. REC. 44 (1941). 
 43. See UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW, supra note 13, at 235–41. 
 47. See, e.g., ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW 
AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY WARS 1–8 (2005); IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: 
THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR II 143–58 (1997); BASIL DAVIDSON, 
AFRICAN CIVILIZATION REVISITED: FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 8–46 (1991); 
FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 75–84 (Constance Farrington trans., 
1963); CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE 
END OF THE REPUBLIC 255–82 (2004); PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF GREAT 
POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000, at 536–40 
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 48. See UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl.; see, e.g., id. arts. 3, 5, 17, 25. 
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and the framers of the Declaration was that the root cause of atrocities 
and armed conflict are frequently found in poverty and discrimination.”49 
The UDHR promoted a conception of freedom not only essential to 
peace and justice, but one organically attached to social justice.50 The 
end of poverty and other social injustice became part of its articulation of 
rights standards.51 
Yet only five articles, articles twenty-two through twenty six, placed 
near the end of the document, outlined notions of rights we could de-
scribe as socioeconomic.52 
Gaining acceptance of rights articulated in the UDHR was promoted as 
only the beginning of efforts to give them universal recognition and pro-
grammatic definition in the world community.53 These rights are still in 
no sense close to being realized more than six decades later.54 This is not 
just because they were thinly described and explicitly deprived of the full 
force of law in any sense. Failure should also be attributed to core disa-
greements over the role of law-mediated competition where preservation 
of the status quo was the sine qua non. The brief interlude of cooperation 
among major powers that had allowed for the superficial consensus on a 
universal rights declaration quickly gave way to reality of Manichean 
competition over raw power within the international community.55 How-
ever, while the East-West rivalry famously sought to privilege one aspect 
of the UDHR over the other, all sides were in agreement on one point: 
they rejected a substantive place for law as law in the resolution of inter-
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 52. See UDHR, supra note 2, at 75–76. Article 22 asserts the right of everyone to 
social security. Article 23 recognized that everyone posseses the “right to work, to free 
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Rights of the Global Poor, in STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 311; AMARTYA SEN, 
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national human rights disputes.56 The United States was no more enam-
ored of the role of law as law in the international sphere than were its 
adversaries.57  
Even though work continued among cosmopolitan elites for richer and 
more binding expressions of universal human rights, the UDHR became 
essentially moribund even as a rhetorical instrument for change for about 
two decades.58 For those at the bottom of society everywhere, these were 
lost decades. The difficulties of building a universal consensus to reduce 
human misery under the UDHR scheme continue to the present.59 
Exaggerated divisions over civil and political rights on the one hand 
and economic and social rights on the other helped to define the UDHR 
scheme in those lost decades.60 Western nations that privileged rights 
discourse as part of their political structures and practices claimed great 
difficulty accepting rights responsibility outside of the traditional civil 
and political arena even as they worked to expand the welfare state.61 
They were loath to accept legally binding governmental responsibility to 
reduce social and economic inequality.62 Even conceding that there were 
practical difficulties with embracing these additional burdens, Western 
objections to economic and social rights were, as they remain, fundamen-
tally ideological.63 The easy assumptions of the “Four Freedom” speech, 
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 61. Id. at 343–44. 
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The concern I have with economic and social rights is when there are broad as-
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cial security, a right to a job, and a right to health care. There, I think, we get 
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that all rights were intimately connected and that freedom from fear and 
freedom from want were inexorably linked and of the same weight, did 
not gain much traction when the struggle against communism became 
existential.64 
The division worsened as the Soviet Union, its allies, and many in the 
emerging Third World adopted and wielded a discourse that claimed to 
privilege economic and social rights.65 It would turn out that their claims 
were mostly bogus, designed to shield ruthless ruling cliques from out-
side critique, a convenient rationalization for holding on to power and 
destroying opposition.66 
Thus at a time of increasing complexity and demands for a new social 
and economic order within and across nations, ruling elites subordinated 
rights discourse into their conceptions of power.67 Western nations, led 
by the United States, retreated into a conception of a public-private di-
vide in which economic and social issues were allocated primarily to the 
private sphere.68 This retreat was more in theory than in practice, at least 
where the socioeconomic issues concerned were considered to be domes-
tic in nature and operation.69 
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trudes fundamentally into an area where the democratic process ought to pre-
vail. 
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 68. See STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 280–82. 
 69. Witness how the Democratic Party and its allies in the United States have fought 
to hold off attempts to privatize or limit social security, medicare, and other welfare pro-
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It took about two decades after the UDHR before the next major step 
toward universal recognition of human rights was advanced in the global 
arena. In 1966, work was completed on two treaties that covered the ter-
rain mapped out by the UDHR in greater detail.70 The International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and its twin, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), 
were a concession to the ideological divide that had greeted the UDHR.71 
It took another ten years before each received enough ratification to be-
come part of the body of explicit and binding international law.72 Under 
international law, these covenants, unlike the declaration, were supposed 
to be solemnly binding on the parties to them.73 
B. Rights Realization: Implementation and Enforcement  
The UDHR and its progenies have nurtured a vast self-replicating army 
of human rights conceptualizers and enforcement agents over the past six 
decades. Their biggest contributions have been in Western societies 
where they infused social structures and political processes with addi-
tional legitimacy to expand and deepen civil and political rights.74 Na-
tional and transnational groups working in these societies found added 
support for rights realization in the UDHR and its derivatives.75 Over 
time, developing countries like India and post-Apartheid South Africa 
that self-consciously embraced a Western legal heritage followed suit.76 
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In the regional settings, Europe has developed a network of suprana-
tional protections through institutions, instruments, and procedures to 
supplement national protections. The Council of Europe, the European 
Court of Human Rights, and the European Union, together with a host of 
other binding regional agreements, have given substance to the meaning 
of human rights for most Europeans.77 The crisis that accompanied the 
breakup of the former Yugoslavia resulted in a broadening and deepen-
ing of the European understanding of human rights for Europeans.78 Af-
ter initial failures, the region, with the leadership and support of the 
United States, has essentially imposed a binding collective responsibility 
to act to defend the human rights of all who live within the political ju-
risdiction of the region.79 Military force and concrete economic support 
have buttressed the expansion of a human rights culture.80 Indeed, Euro-
pean activists have pushed the boundaries and experiences of the accom-
plishment beyond continental borders.81 
The regional contributions of this movement have been much less sat-
isfying in other regions of the world. The African experience is still little 
better than hapless mimicry.82 The Latin American experience continues 
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to be of more value to academics than to those who face domestic and 
transnational oppression.83 At this point, it is difficult to make a generali-
zation about a pan-Asian human rights culture. Each of the major nation-
al entities in Asia appears to be forging unique national traditions in hu-
man rights protection.84 The idea that development of a human rights 
culture must await national economic progress has been promoted with 
considerable success by autocratic Asian government leaders.85 Howev-
er, as Professor Ghai has argued, “fruitful Asian perspectives on human 
rights must therefore transcend obfuscation of culturalism, locate human 
rights in the contingencies of their political economy, and urge struggle 
domestically as well as globally since no economies now are purely na-
tional.”86 
Social and economic rights have not fared as well. The ICESCR was 
never granted the same stature in operation that the ICCPR received.87 
Substantively, the Covenant reaffirmed the core economic and social 
rights identified in the UDHR. Arguably, it gave them more content and 
provided states as well as human rights advocates with more specific ex-
pectations in areas of work, adequate and equal compensation, social 
security, physical and mental health, education, housing, and the like. 
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In the West, this Covenant has never been the equal of its twin. It has 
not been ratified by the United States and other Western nations that 
have ratified it have generally emphasized its programmatic nature, 
vagueness, and lack of justiciability in according it lesser status.88 The 
non-Western nations that have paid rhetorical homage to its importance 
have generally lacked both the material resources and political commit-
ments to give its provisions anything near the force of law.89 
Needless to say, this is an outcome that proponents of ICESCR do not 
accept. The official and popular position of the international human 
rights community is that the two covenants and the sets of rights they 
proclaim are “universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelat-
ed.”90 Yet the language of the ICESCR betrays its second-class nature. It 
is a language of limitations and promises, not guarantees or demands. 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR captures the fundamental lack of seriousness 
that borders on cruel deception: 
Each state party to the present Covenant undertake to take steps . . . to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving pro-
gressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures.91 
The UN took a tiny step toward some form of implementation by creat-
ing a Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1985 
charged with monitoring and promoting efforts by state parties to imple-
ment these rights.92 However, the Committee has no punitive powers and 
could not direct resources to nations needing help toward gaining com-
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pliance.93 It meets regularly, engages state parties in dialogues, and is-
sues reports that are valuable largely because of the light they shed on 
the enormous scale of problems.94 
II. SUBSTANTIVE FAILURES OF THE UDHR ENTERPRISE  
The most glaring failure of the UDHR regime has been in the socioec-
onomic realm. Its complete inability to tackle global economic inequality 
and resulting misery sufficiently exposes its essential irrelevance. Admit-
tedly, its economic component was a grudging import into its architec-
ture from the start.95 Over time, the interests and rhetoric of liberal inter-
nationalism have never conceded power on this front.96 This posture is 
quite understandable if preserving economic and political power is seen 
as the ends of the project in the first place. However, even in the sphere 
of civil and political rights, the UDHR regime should be considered a 
failure. 
This section elaborates on the comprehensive substantive failure of the 
rights regime in all fields. However, before doing so, a brief comment on 
the difficulty of separating these categories in dealing with the failures is 
in order. Any human rights discussion that seeks to address so-called 
economic and social rights separately from civil and political ones or to 
privilege one set over the other has to confront a hard reality and a core 
doctrinal objection. The hard reality is that issues that are generally clas-
sified as civil and political always seem more urgent or desperate in 
comparison to those traditionally seen as economic and social. It is very 
difficult to ignore or put aside for even a brief moment images of ongo-
ing violent international or civil conflict, ethnic cleansing, diverse crimes 
against humanity, government crackdown, terrorism, torture, disappear-
ances, etc. These issues have more grip on our attention and, perhaps 
more importantly, are more easily captured for television presentation. In 
contrast, economic deprivations, except perhaps when captured as imag-
es of natural disasters or emaciated famine victims, tend to more quickly 
fade into the landscape of general human misery.97 
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The doctrinal objection is that human rights are, by official interpreta-
tion, supposed to be treated as indivisible, interrelated, interdependent, 
and equal.98 This is a foundational belief in the human rights movement 
and is one that is defended vigorously, even if mainly in theory.99 
One way to reconcile these concerns, of course, is to always try to dis-
cuss human rights in their complex interrelatedness, interdependence, 
indivisibility, and equality. After all, that appears to be what was intend-
ed by the structure and promise of the UDHR before Cold War politics 
intervened to create largely unsupportable categorical and doctrinal divi-
sions.100 The problem with this approach is that deprioritized discussions 
of rights quickly get dominated in execution by the seemingly more ur-
gent demands of the moment. Add to this the fact that Western heritage 
and socialization have conditioned many of us to see human rights as 
pertaining more to those issues classifiable as civil or political than eco-
nomic and social.101 Torture, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, waterboarding, 
extraordinary renditions, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Eastern Congo, Gaza, and 
Myanmar all seem more urgent when seen in the classic civil and politi-
cal perspective than as economic and social issues encompassing slow, 
quiet, and mostly out of sight suffering and deaths of millions. 
This Article’s examination of the current state of socioeconomic rights 
will begin with the note that a focus on socioeconomic issues serves pri-
marily to highlight how central these considerations are to a thorough 
understanding of the promise and limits of the human rights age. Accept-
ing the interconnected and indivisible nature of all aspects of human dig-
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nity, a conversation about war should bring up the enduring socioeco-
nomic misery that wars breed and reflect. When one thinks about, say 
genocide in Darfur, Rwanda, or the Congo, the horrors of Iraq or Myan-
mar, torture, disappearances, ethnic cleansing, or pervasive violence 
against women, one should also see long term intranational and transna-
tional competition for scarce resources and the essential roles played by 
multinational corporations within the global economic system in main-
taining, nurturing, and in some cases, promoting conflicts and ensuring 
misery.102 Better still, one should flip the considerations. Think first eve-
ry day about socioeconomic deprivation—abject poverty; pervasive and 
unyielding gender oppression; global and communal competition for nat-
ural resources; and access to water, heath care, and educational opportu-
nities—then think about wars, ethnic cleansing, torture, disappearances, 
and other so-called civil and political violations that police the status 
quo. 
A. Civil and Political Rights: A Celebration of Incoherence  
Since World War II there have been more than one hundred wars, for 
the most part civil conflicts. In those conflicts, millions of people have 
been slaughtered, raped and forced to flee their homes and their coun-
tries.103 
Devotees of the human rights culture nurtured by the UDHR and its 
progenies have invested much greater resources in the civil-political 
realm than in the economic and social sphere.104 Yet the comprehensive 
nature of their failures, even in this arena, is masked only by abundant 
faith and continuing zeal. Examining three sets of issues that define civil 
and political rights captures the breadth and depth of failure: genocide 
and crimes against humanity, torture, and violence against women. 
1. Crimes against Humanity and Genocide 
Crimes against humanity105 may be considered the ultimate generalized 
expression of humanity’s revulsion and rejection of certain evil behavior. 
                                                                                                             
 102. See RICHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL 
CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 425–26, 428 (1994); WALTER RODNEY, 
HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 231–36 (1972). 
 103. Richard J. Goldstone, Foreword to WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 7 
(Belinda Cooper ed., 1999) [hereinafter WAR CRIMES]. 
 104. See STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 370; Muzaffar, supra note 21, at 414–18. 
 105. Crimes against humanity was first defined in the Nuremberg Charter, Article 6, as 
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or 
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Genocide106 may be considered a particular species of this prohibition. 
Both crimes arose out of longstanding efforts to discipline the conduct of 
international conflicts through law.107 Crimes against humanity came to 
the fore at the post-World War II trials of defeated war criminals108 while 
the identification of genocide awaited a convention109 that was developed 
at the same time as the UDHR. Both crimes against humanity and geno-
cide may today be said to represent a legal prohibition of the “worst of 
the worst”—an expression of what must absolutely be prevented if we 
are to have a baseline of human rights culture. The two crimes intersect 
and bind the fields of human rights and humanitarian law in keeping with 
the core liberal internationalist assertion that links international peace 
and security to human rights.110 Both crimes, like the crime of torture, are 
generally considered to be jus cogens.111 
To the degree that the liberal internationalist rights scheme makes any 
claim of substantive seriousness, it should be reflected in its actions 
                                                                                                             
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in con-
nection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
U.N. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. 
This extraordinarily broad humanitarian intervention in support of human rights emanat-
ing from the specific situation of World War II has been carried forward in subsequent 
definitions of the crime. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 
7(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 106. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Prevention Convention]. Arti-
cle II of the Convention defines genocide as any of a series of “acts committed with in-
tent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Id. art. 
2; see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia arts. 
3, 4, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993); Rome Statute, supra note 105. 
 107. Both crimes challenged the right of the state to wage wars without limits. 
 108. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 105, art. 6(c). 
 109. Prevention Convention, supra note 106. 
 110. UDHR, supra note 2, at 71–72 (“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, jus-
tice and peace in the world.”). The UDHR Preamble goes on to link “barbarous acts 
which have outraged to conscience of mankind” to “disregard and contempt for human 
rights.” Id. pmbl.; see also ICCPR, supra note 72, pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 72, pmbl.; 
U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 73. 
 111. Convention of the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(defining the concept of jus cogens or a peremptory norm of general international law as 
“a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as 
a norm from which no derogation is permitted”). While no comprehensive authoritative 
list of such norms exist, genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture would appear to 
satisfy all of the elements. 
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against these two highly evocative crimes. Yet, when one considers the 
widespread atrocities of our post-World War II age—Bosnia, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Eastern Congo, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Burma (Myanmar), 
North Korea, and Afghanistan under the Taliban are some of the cases 
that come easily to mind—the incapacity of the rights regime to make a 
difference ought to shock one’s conscience.112 These cases do not in any 
way represent the totality of instances of sustained gross violations of 
human rights that meet the elements of crimes against humanity and, in 
some cases, genocide. The utter inability of the liberal internationalist 
regime to impact the origin, course, or resolution of these grievous atroc-
ities is striking.113 Such comprehensive ineffectiveness cannot be dis-
missed as merely unfortunate failures of implementation. It cannot be 
unreasonable to expect that the UDHR and its progenies, sixty years 
hence, would at least have developed a credible role in preventing the 
recurrence of the most grievous of international human rights violations. 
The response of the rights regime to these atrocities seems to be gen-
eral acceptance of them as part of life. This fact may not be apparent giv-
en the huge amount of attention and resources poured into endless dis-
cussions, negotiations, occasional deployment of peacekeepers and, of 
course, post-atrocity tribunals.114 This does not just refer to the fact that 
                                                                                                             
 112. Barbara Harff, No Lessons Learned From the Holocaust? Assessing the Risk of 
Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 57, 60 (2003); 
see WAR CRIMES, supra note 103, at 7–8. 
 113. The Obama administration issued a presidential directive on August 4, 2011, 
creating a so-called “high-level Atrocities Prevention Board within the U.S. government 
to provide early warning of impending atrocities and human rights crisis abroad and to 
recommend early action to prevent such crimes.” US: Presidential Directives a Step to 
Ensuring “Never Again”, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 4, 2011), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/04/us-presidential-directives-step-ensuring-never-
again; see also Helene Cooper, Obama Takes Steps to Help Avert Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 3, 2011, at A11, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/us/politics/04policy.html. The directive would have 
added little to the efforts to prevent mass murder in Bosnia or Rwanda since in both cas-
es, high-level decision-makers had ample evidence of impending criminality. See, e.g., 
AMNESTY INT’L, THE 1994 REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD 251–53, 
319–21 (1994); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1996—RWANDA (Jan. 1, 1996), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a8af2c.html; Videotape: Forsaken 
Cries: The Story of Rwanda (Amnesty Int’l USA 1997) [hereinafter Forsaken Cries]. 
 114. On the tribunals, see Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, supra note 106; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Antonio Cassese, The Role of Inter-
nationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against International Criminality, in 
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, 
KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA 1, 1–13 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004); see also Rupert 
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the Khmer Rouge murdered with alacrity while the world was absent or 
that the UN and world powers deliberately ignored mounting evidence of 
the preparations for genocide in Rwanda115 or that intervention in Bosnia 
came only after the massacre at Srebrenica in 1995.116 More importantly, 
the plain facts are that those who contemplate, nurture, or engage in or-
ganized and systematized violence that leads to crimes against humanity 
or genocide are completely unimpressed or unaffected by the human 
rights regimentation of our time.117 The eerie similarity between the 
propaganda to promote genocide in Rwanda and Nazi Germany,118 the 
shocking sameness to the violent practices of repressive governments119 
and rebel groups around the world, and the unbridled flow of weapons to 
                                                                                                             
Skilbeck, Funding Justice: The Price of War Crimes Trials, 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 6, 6–10 
(2008). 
 115. See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE 
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 148–49 (1998); GERARD PRUNIER, 
THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 234–37 (1995); see also Makau Mutua, 
Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMPLE INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 1, 176–77 (1997) [hereinafter Mutua, Never Again]; Forsaken Cries, supra 
note 113. 
 116. Over 7,000 men and boys were murdered by the Bosnian Serb soldiers after they 
took over the town that had been declared a safe area by the UN. See SREBRENICA: A CRY 
FROM THE GRAVE (Thirteen/WNET 1999); see also Ibrahim J. Gassama, World Order in 
the Post-Cold War Era: The Relevance and Role of the United Nations after Fifty Years, 
20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 255, 277–83 (1994); Mutua, Never Again, supra note 115, at 181; 
Serbia Apologizes for 1995 Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at A8. 
 117. GERARD PRUNIER, DARFUR: THE AMBIGUOUS GENOCIDE, at xi, 130 (2006); Alison 
Des Forges, Documenting Horror: The Administration of the Rwandan Genocide, in 
WAR CRIMES, supra note 103, at 139–53; Tim Johnston, U.S. Seeks New Tack on Burma, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2009, at A13. 
 118. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 115, at 93–98; Des Forges, supra note 117, at 136–
53. 
 119. The Arab spring, popular revolts in the Arab world that gathered steam in 2011, is 
a case in point. All of the regimes reacted with the same massive display of force and 
unbridled violence. Libyan dictator, Ghadaffi, was apparently prepared to take actions of 
genocidal proportions in the rebel-dominated city of Bengazi until international military 
actions stopped him. While the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt succumbed in response to 
domestic and international pressures, others in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain have not held 
back on the use of raw violence to retain power. See Ian Black & Nour Ali, Syria Pro-
tests: Troops Renew Attacks on Pro-Democracy Demonstrators, GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 
2011, at 21; Nathan Brown, Hope and Change, FOREIGN POLICY (May 18, 2011), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/18/hope_and_change; Dan Murphy, No 
Evidence of Libya Viagra Rape Claims. But War Crimes? Plenty, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (June 24, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0624/No-evidence-of-Libya-
Viagra-rape-claims.-But-war-crimes-Plenty. 
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areas of conflict affirm the global acceptance, and sometimes even pro-
motion, of large-scale atrocities.120 
Governments, international institutions, and multinational business in-
terests have failed to subordinate other interests to the prevention of the-
se crimes.121 Even when the existing international machinery can no 
longer ignore atrocities and have to respond, the responses are precisely 
limited to ensure that more enduring and profitable interests are protect-
ed.122 For example, the vaunted crimes tribunals do not reach the colonial 
powers that stoke ethnic or tribal divisions.123 Nor do they inquire into 
the role of multinational economic institutions or transnational business 
interests in fostering these conflicts.124 Such inquiry would come too 
close to the status quo protection function of the liberal international re-
gime. 
2. Torture 
If one were to ask a representative number of people committed  to 
human rights values which if any right among, say those  declared in 
the UDHR had priority in importance, torture  would surely rank 
high on the list . . . If anything is a human right, then it’s the right not to 
be tortured.125 
Torture could be considered the one true thing in the international hu-
man rights scheme until the Bush administration’s enhanced interroga-
                                                                                                             
 120. Jean Mukimbiri, The Seven Stages of the Rwandan Genocide, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 823, 824 (2005). 
 121. See, e.g., Katie Redford & Beth Stephens, The Story of Doe v. Unocal, Justice 
Delayed But Not Denied, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 433, 433–62 (Deena R. 
Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009). 
 122. International or hybrid crimes tribunals are generally given quite limited man-
dates as to whom they may pursue. See Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court For Sierra 
Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 3, 417–18, 448–50 (2011); see also Julie 
Mertus, Only A War Crimes Tribunal: Triumph of the “International Community,” Pain 
of the Survivors, in WAR CRIMES, supra note 103, 229–42 (highlighting other limitations 
of these responses to large scale atrocities). 
 123. For example, the Rwandan crimes tribunal (“ICTR”) did not reach the role of 
former colonial powers such as Belgium and France in the conflict. See LINDA MELVERN, 
A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN RWANDA’S GENOCIDE 24–25 (2000); 
Paul Schmitt, The Future of Genocide Suits at the International Court of Justice: 
France’s Roles in Rwanda and the Implications of the Bosnia v. Serbia Decision, 40 GEO. 
J. INT’L L. 585, 594–96 (2009). 
 124. GREG CAMPBELL, BLOOD DIAMONDS: TRACING THE DEADLY PATH OF THE 
WORLD’S MOST PRECIOUS STONES 20–23 (2002); John Christopher Anderson, Respecting 
Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 
468–70 (2000). 
 125. STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 224. 
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tion program confirmed and exposed the soft underbelly of this supposed 
peremptory norm and the hypocrisy of Western rhetoric. Article 5 of the 
UDHR states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment.”126 This prohibition was reaf-
firmed in Article 7 of the ICCPR which adds, in Article 4, that no dero-
gation from this norm was permissible under the covenant.127 To prevent 
any misunderstanding of the regime’s position on this matter, a separate 
international agreement prohibiting torture was concluded in 1984.128 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) provided a comprehensive definition 
of torture even as it left room for even deeper expression of humanity’s 
collective abhorrence of this conduct.129 The CAT was explicit that “no 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat 
of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may 
be invoked as a justification of torture.”130 It further rejects using an or-
der from a superior officer or a public authority as a justification of tor-
ture.131 
Even though the United States ratified the convention in 1994 and 
passed domestic legislation implementing the agreement,132 the atmos-
phere and security conditions emanating from the September 11, 2001 
attacks by Al Qaeda could not sustain even rhetorical adherence to the 
treaty.133 The formal assault on the torture norm began with lawyers do-
ing what they were asked to do, that is, to provide a legal justification for 
                                                                                                             
 126. UDHR supra note 2, at 73. All four Geneva Conventions also prohibit torture, 
defining the term and incorporating it within the category of grave breaches. See, e.g., 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 3, 130, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 127. ICCPR, supra note 72, at 53. 
 128. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85 (1988) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. 
 129. Id. Article 1(1) defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering . . . is 
intentionally inflicted on a person.” Id. art. 1(1). Article 1(2) stated that the definition was 
“without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or 
may contain provisions of wider application.” Id. art. 1(2). Thus states could adopt defini-
tions of torture that go further than the international consensus contained in the CAT. 
 130. See id. art. 2(2). 
 131. See id. art. 2(3). 
 132. See Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2004). 
 133. See Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Alberto Gonzalez, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memoran-
dum], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf. 
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a widespread transnational program of torture.134 This evisceration of the 
norm was accomplished by the usual process of redefinition and differen-
tiation.135 However, no one misunderstood what was being done, even if 
it was called “enhanced interrogation” and limited only to “high-value 
targets.”136 Indeed, long before high officials such as President George 
W. Bush and Vice President Richard Cheney admitted that they had au-
thorized the torture of detainees, the public was largely on board with the 
program.137 In any case, there was a more established, more broadly ac-
cepted torture regime existing within the rubric of the so-called extraor-
dinary rendition program.138 
In truth, the public, with the assistance of Hollywood, had long been 
prepared to understand that official pronouncements on torture were 
                                                                                                             
 134. See, e.g., id. The Bybee Memorandum infamously restricted the definition of 
torture and its expansive interpretation of the powers of the U.S. president in the national 
security arena caused belated controversy. In response to the controversy, subsequent 
memos tried to walk back these understandings. However, leading figures in the Bush 
administration, including President Bush and Vice President Cheney, have remained firm 
and unapologetic. They have done so without adverse consequences. 
 135. See id. Former Attorney General Michael Mukasey defended the use of torture by 
calling it “harsh interrogation” in response to criticsm by U.S. Senator John McCain. See 
Marc A. Thiessen, Mukasey Responds to McCain’s Op-Ed, WASH. POST: POSTPARTISAN 
BLOG (May 12, 2011, 5:10 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
partisan/post/mukasey-responds-to-mccains-op-ed/2011/05/12/AFhhVO1G_blog.html. 
For a spirited defense of torture by any other name, see Jennifer Rubin, Sen. John 
McCain Gets His Facts Wrong On EITs [Enhanced Interrogation Techniques], WASH. 
POST: RIGHT TURN BLOG (May 13, 2011, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/sen-john-mccain-gets-his-facts-
wrong-on-eits/2011/03/29/AFE4AS2G_blog.html. 
 136. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency 
(May 10, 2005) (discussing whether “certain specified interrogation techniques” includ-
ing waterboarding, may be used on a “high value” Al Qaeda detainee); see also Peter 
Finn & Julie Tate, CIA Says It Misjudged Role of High-Value Detainee Abu Zubaida, 
Transcript Shows, WASH. POST (June 16, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/15/AR2009061503045.html. 
 137. See Greg Miller, Cheney OK’d Harsh CIA Tactics, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2008), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/16/nation/na-cheney16; Paul Steinhauser, Poll: 
Don’t Investigate Torture Techniques, CNN POLITICAL TICKER BLOG (May 6, 2009, 
12:33 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/05/06/poll-dont-investigate-torture-
techniques/. 
 138. Fact Sheet: Extraordinary Rendition, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION [ACLU] (Dec. 
6, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/fact-sheet-extraordinary-rendition; see 
also Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary 
Rendition” Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106. 
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“less than meets the eye.”139 Once “bad guys” were properly defined and 
presented, torture, law, and human rights did not apply to them. The un-
derstanding that the rights regime does not apply in all cases has long 
been accepted by governments as well as ordinary people.140 
The United States was by no means the only Western country that has 
been forced to acknowledge the limit of institutional adherence to the 
torture prohibition. The United Kingdom and Israel have also had their 
commitments tested in crisis.141 Of course, far beyond the direct contra-
dictions reflected in the practices of these Western countries in the face 
of national emergencies, the routine disregard of the comprehensive edi-
fice against torture has not been a secret.142 For a long time, torture was 
tolerated domestically in assorted local police agencies, jails, prisons, 
and other public institutions in these countries.143 In the international 
arena, torture was routinely farmed out to cooperative regimes, mostly in 
the Third World.144 Indeed it would appear that in some cases, the torture 
relationship was the primary basis of cooperation between the West and 
                                                                                                             
 139. Arguably, one of the more popular American television dramas of the post-
September 11th period was “24” which depicted extraordinary feats of bravery accompa-
nied by shocking violence on the part of the “good guys.” 
 140. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsu, Justice Lost! The Failure of Inter-
national Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. PEACE RES. 407, 412–
13 (2007); John Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger of Human Rights 
from Kidnapping Terror Suspects, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 193, 213 (1993). 
 141. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, ¶ 
164 (1978) (finding that British authorities had engaged in inhuman and degrading treat-
ment but not torture against IRA suspects); HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Tor-
ture in Israel v. Governmentt of Israel 53(4) P.D. 817, paras. 1, 23 [1999] (Isr.). 
 142. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1998); INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE 
DEPT. [CHRISTOPHER COMM’N], REPORT OF THE INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE 
DEP’T 29–60 (1991); John Floyd & Billy Sinclair, Police Misconduct: A Growing Epi-
demic?, JOHNTFLOYD.COM (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/february11/Houston-Police-Brutality.htm. 
 143. Perhaps it is with due appreciation of this reality that the U.S., for example, added 
reservations to its acceptance of its international obligations regarding torture or cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment, or punishment. These reservations limited the defini-
tions of these terms. 
 144. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Getting Away With Torture: The Bush Administra-
tion and Mistreatment of Detainees 33–38 (2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0711webwcover.pdf (discussing exam-
ples of extraordinary rendition); John F. Burns & Alan Cowell, British Panel to Examine 
Libya Rendition Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, at A11, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/world/europe/06britain.html; Rod Norland, Files 
Note Close C.I.A. Ties To Qaddafi Spy Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2011, at A1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/03/world/africa/03libya.html?pagewanted=all. 
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disfavored regimes like those of Ghaddafi in Libya and Assad in Syria.145 
The occasional hue and cry against particular revelations of torture fo-
cused on the usual disfavored suspects.146 Many instances were resolved 
as simply exceptions to the rule.147 
However, it took the U.S. Justice Department’s torture memorandums 
and the immunity granted subsequently to official American torturers to 
blow open the insubstantiality of the whole system of prohibition that 
had buttressed the anti-torture norm.148 We are left with the question: if 
this is what happens to one of the most important human rights in the 
breach, what do rights really represent? 
3. Gender Oppression  
Tragically, women are most often the ones whose human rights are vio-
lated. Even in the late 20th century, the rape of women continues to be 
used as an instrument of armed conflict. Women and children make up 
a large majority of the world’s refugees. And when women are exclud-
ed from the political process, they become even more vulnerable to 
abuse. I believe that now, on the eve of a new millennium, it is time to 
break our silence. It is time for us to say here in Beijing, and the world 
to hear, that it is no longer acceptable to discuss women’s rights as sep-
arate from human rights.149 
No area of human rights law and activism captures the drama and in-
substantiality of the UDHR regime better than women’s rights. Over the 
past sixty plus years, a plethora of international agreements, declarations, 
resolutions, and the like—backed by a network of organizations and 
                                                                                                             
 145. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Getting Away With Torture, supra note 144; Burns & 
Alan Cowell, supra 144; Norland, supra note 144. 
 146. See Editorial, Malign Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2011, at WK7, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/22/opinion/22sun1.html?_r=1. 
 147. Kenneth Roth, Op., The Books Aren’t Closed on Bush’s Torture Policy, WASH. 
POST, July 11, 2011, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
books-arent-closed-on-bushs-torture-policy/2011/07/11/gIQA3v0e9H_story.html. Ken-
neth Roth, head of Human Rights Watch, has criticized the Obama administration for 
refusing to hold those responsible for torture during the Bush administration accountable. 
He argues that “Obama’s deliberate suppression of this shameful past is wrong. It reflects 
bad policy, a dereliction of presidential responsibilities and a continuing disregard for 
international law. It treats torture as a policy option—one that can be turned on or off at 
presidential will.” Id. 
 148. See A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html (last visited on Jan. 
22, 2012); Accountability for Torture, ACLU, www.aclu.org/accountability/released.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2012). 
 149. Hillary Rodham Clinton, First Lady of the U.S., Remarks to the U.N. 4th World 
Conference on Women Plenary Session (Sept. 5, 1995). 
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seemingly perpetual gatherings—affirmed and reaffirmed the fundamen-
tal equality of men and women.150 “Women’s rights are human rights” is 
a mantra repeated often.151 Beginning with the UN Charter itself, the 
formal edifice in support of women’s equality extends through the 
UDHR and the two covenants.152 The regime’s structural defenses cul-
minated in the development of the comprehensive and innovative Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Wom-
en (“CEDAW”).153 
In spite of all this and the innumerable international conferences and 
pronouncements on the subject, the fact remains that gender inequality, 
the oppression of women, and violence against women are the most 
common and consistent features of the global society today.154 This reali-
ty unites governments and non-governmental authorities, traditional as 
well as popular cultures, Left and Right, across the world. Indications of 
the acceptance of the formal and operational inequality of women 
abound whether the issue is the fate of women and girls under the Tali-
ban in Afghanistan, religious hierarchies in general, sex-selective abor-
tions or infanticide of baby girls, domestic violence in every society, po-
litical representation, or pornography.155 The most striking aspects of this 
reality are not the insistent routine denouncements of gender discrimina-
                                                                                                             
 150. See ICCPR, supra note 72, arts. 2(1), 3; ICESCR, supra note 72, arts. 2(2), 3; 
UDHR, supra note 2, art. 2. 
 151. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 149. 
 152. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; see, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 72, at 49–50. 
 153. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter 
CEDAW]. 
 154. See STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 175–85. 
 155. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 19, Violence against Women, U.N. Doc. A/47/38, 11th Sess. 
(1992), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom19; 
see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE TALIBAN’S WAR AGAINST WOMEN (2001), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/6185.htm (discussing how the Taliban restricts the rights of 
women in Afghanistan under its repressive regime); Rebecca Conway, Rape, Mutilation: 
Pakistan’s Tribal Justice for Women, REUTERS (Aug. 12, 2011, 6:08 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/12/us-pakistan-women-
idUSTRE77B63I20110812 (discussing how women are killed or disfigured due to honor 
killings or local tribal justice); Muneeza Naqvi, Despite Rapid Growth, India Let Its Girls 
Die, ASSOC. PRESS, May 4, 2011, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13524008#.TzgS4Rx2hNo (discussing 
how in India girls are less favored than boys and sometimes selective abortion occurs 
once the child’s sex is found). 
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tion or violence against women, nor stirring calls for action. It is the 
broad-based acceptance or “normalization” of this state of affairs.156 
Wars are not authorized by the UN Security Council to protect women; 
governments are not expelled and diplomatic recognition is not with-
drawn for the systematic abuse of women. Female heads of state or heads 
of government, except for the few royals, are a rarity.157 No major inter-
national financial institution had a woman at its head until 2011 when 
Christine Lagarde of France was selected in an emergency to head the 
International Monetary Fund, replacing a male executive director facing 
serious sexual violence charges.158 Major domestic and international 
business entities, as well as non-profits, are still largely controlled by 
males.159 Executive, legislative, and judicial institutions worldwide re-
main the preserve of men across the globe.160 Women are affirmatively 
excluded from power throughout the world, and efforts to include them 
must struggle to overcome entrenched legal, political, economic, and 
social impediments.161 
                                                                                                             
 156. As such the following statement of stunning horror can be made without hope of 
contradiction: “Even the government has accepted that it has failed to save millions of 
little girls.” Naqvi, supra note 155. The Indian Home Secretary, Gopal Krishna Pillai, 
confirmed the truth of the charge: “Whatever measures that have been put in over the last 
40 years have not had any impact.” Id. A recent article about violence against women in 
Pakistan noted that the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan claimed almost 800 wom-
en were murdered through “honor killings” and about 2900 women were victims of rape. 
Conway, supra note 155. 
 157. STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 179–83; Andrew Reynolds, Women in the Legis-
latures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling, 51 WORLD 
POL. 547, 558 (1999). 
 158. See Lagarde, Taking Over IMF, Vows to Diversify Board, ECON. TIMES, (July 7, 
2011, 6:47 AM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/lagarde-
taking-over-imf-vows-to-diversify-board/articleshow/9132487.cms; see also John Eligon, 
Judge Denies Bail to I.M.F. Chief in Sexual Assault Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2011, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/nyregion/imf-chief-is-held-
without-bail.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the former head of the I.M.F. facing sexual 
assault charges). 
 159. Nancy J. Adler, Global Leadership: Women Leaders, 37 MGMT. INT’L REV. 171, 
171–75 (1997), available at http://www.jstor.org/pss/40228426. 
 160. See STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 179–83; Comm. on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 23, Women in Political and 
Public Life, U.N. Doc. A/52/38, 16th Sess. (1997) [hereinafter General Recommendation 
No. 23], available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom23. 
 161. See General Recommendation No. 23, supra note 160, paras. 20–23. 
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CEDAW was an innovative response to pervasive gender discrimina-
tion and oppression that has had only very limited positive results.162 
CEDAW properly recognized the confluence of social, economic, and 
political forces that act publicly and privately to maintain the structures 
and processes of oppression.163 The convention demolished the civil-
political and social-economic divides and challenged the private-public 
dichotomy.164 Its blunt, broad-based, and comprehensive approach could 
be seen as a capstone of rights regimentation, making it the most com-
prehensive substantive extension of liberal internationalism. CEDAW is 
also one of the most widely ratified human rights treaties, as well as the 
one with the most reservations.165 Its ineffectiveness is tragic and con-
                                                                                                             
 162. CEDAW, supra note 153, pmbl. “On 18 December 1979, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted by the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. It entered into force as an international treaty on 3 September 1981 after 
the twentieth country had ratified it.” Id. The Convention had 187 parties as of August 
2011. The United States is one of seven countries that is not a party to CEDAW. Id.; see 
Mark Leon Goldberg, CEDAW in the Senate, U.N. DISPATCH (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.undispatch.com/cedaw-in-the-senate (stating that the U.S. has signed 
CEDAW but the Senate has not ratified it); see also Darren Rosenblum, What’s Wrong 
With “Women’s Rights,” and Why the US Should Ratify CEDAW Anyway, FEMINIST LAW 
PROFESSORS BLOG (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2010/11. 
 163. See CEDAW, supra note 153, art. 1. 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “discrimination against 
women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis 
of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recogni-
tion, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental free-
doms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
Id. 
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, eco-
nomic[,] and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
[ensure] the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of 
guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms on a basis of equality with men. 
See also id. art. 3. 
 164. See Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategiz-
ing Women’s Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Dorinda Dollmeyer ed., 1993). 
 165. See, e.g., Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia’s Reservations (Oct. 2000), available at 
http://www.bayefsky.com/html/saudiarabia_t2_cedaw.php. 
1. In case of contradiction between any term of the Convention and 
the norms of [I]slamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to 
observe the contradictory terms of the Convention. 
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firms the limited utility of this approach.166 The CEDAW Committee 
may be more passionate and creative in its responses but it has been just 
as ineffectual as all the other institutions created to promote the illusion 
of rights progress under the banner of liberal internationalism. As much 
as the substance and processes of CEDAW capture the dynamic of op-
pression between men and women, it still only grazes the core issue of 
whether it is possible to change the trajectory of misery and violence in 
the world without challenging liberal internationalism’s stranglehold on 
thought and action. 
B. Economic Inequality  
We live in a world of unprecedented opulence of a kind that would 
have been hard even to imagine a century or two ago. There have also 
been remarkable changes beyond the economic sphere. The twentieth 
century has established democratic and participatory governance as the 
preeminent model of political organization. Concepts of human rights 
and political liberty are now very much a part of the prevailing rhetoric 
. . . [a]nd yet we also live in a world with remarkable deprivation, desti-
tution[,] and oppression.167 
The economic and social rights promises of the UDHR and the 
ICESCR are not close to being realized after six decades of human rights 
regimentation.168 The passage of time has not enhanced the structure and 
processes envisioned by the UDHR in the sphere of economic and social 
rights. For one thing, the efforts to concretize these aspirations have not 
been embraced by most governmental authorities, the work of many in 
                                                                                                             
2. The Kingdom does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of ar-
ticle 9 of the Convention and paragraph 1 of article 29 of the Conven-
tion. 
Id. 
 166. See, e.g., Hope Lewis, Lionheart Gals Facing the Dragon: The Human Rights of 
Inter/National Black Women in the United States, 76 OR. L. REV. 567, 612–16 (1997); 
Sifa Mtango, A State of Oppression? Women’s Rights in Saudi Arabia, 5 ASIA-PAC. J. 
HUM. RTS. & L. 49, 65–67 (2004); Karen Musalo, Elisabeth Pellegrin & S. Shawn Rob-
erts, Crimes without Punishment: Violence against Women in Guatemala, 21 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 161, 191–92 (2010); Jennifer Riddle, Note, Making CEDAW Universal: A 
Critique of CEDAW’s Reservation Regime under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the 
Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 605, 623–25 (2002). 
 167. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 54, at xi. 
 168. See Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human 
Rights and Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development 
Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755, 762–64 (2005) [hereinafter Alston, Ships Passing]; Pogge, 
supra note 54, at 311. 
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civil society notwithstanding.169 In many societies where such mandates 
have received quasi-legal acceptance, there has been little evidence of 
progress.170 In those societies where there has been measurable progress 
toward economic security, governments are reluctant to give such pro-
gress the security of legally binding commitment.171 
In recognition of the persistence of misery after more than six decades 
of rights regimentation, world authorities under the auspices of the UN 
embarked on a new direction in 2000. In September 2000, world leaders 
proclaimed the MDGs at the UN Millennium Summit attended by 189 
heads of state and government.172 While employing the solemn language 
of a compact among nations (but staying within the confines of a non-
legally binding declaration), the MDGs represent a final concession that 
the language and processes of law suffusing the rights discourse have 
been exhausted and a return to politics, or the explicitly political, is nec-
essary.173 
1. Capturing the Landscape of Misery 
Desperate women bind their stomachs to deaden hunger pains, eating 
next to nothing so children can be fed.174 
To get a full picture of the failure of the liberal international approach 
in the economic and social arena, it is important to review the enormity 
of socioeconomic deprivation afflicting the world today. There is no bet-
                                                                                                             
 169. See OHCHR Statement, supra note 87, annex III, paras. 5, 7; Alston, Ships Pass-
ing, supra note 168, at 755. 
 170. See Indian States Have More Poor Than 26 Poorest African Nations, TIMES INDIA 
(July 12, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-07-
12/india/28276383_1_measure-ophi-multidimensional-poverty-index; see also Michael 
R. Carter & Julian May, One Kind of Freedom: Poverty Dynamics in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa 26 (Univ. of Wis. Working Paper No. 427, 1999), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACL429.pdf. 
 171. Robert J. Samuelson, Op., The Welfare State Wins the Budget War, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-welfare-state-wins-this-
budget-war/2011/08/07/gIQA4fuE1I_story.html (discussing the uncertainty regarding 
social security, welfare, and other public programs in the U.S.’s most recent budget de-
bates). 
 172. Millennium Declaration, supra note 28, para. 1. 
 173. The MDGs comprise these eight goals to be achieved by 2015: Eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and 
empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global 
partnership for development. Id. at 1–8. 
 174. David Randall & Nada Issa, A Grotesque Symbol of Starving Africa, INDEP. (July 
17, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/a-grotesque-symbol-of-
starving-africa-2314969.html. 
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ter source to begin with than the UN Development Program 
(“UNDP”).175 According to the UNDP, “every hour 1200 children die 
away from the glare of media attention. This is the equivalent of three 
tsunamis a month, every month.176 The causes of death will vary, but the 
overwhelming majority can be traced to a single pathology: poverty.”177 
Unlike the tsunami, the report argues, the pathology of poverty is pre-
ventable. “With today’s technology, financial resources and accumulated 
knowledge, the world has the capacity to overcome extreme deprivation. 
Yet, as an international community we allow poverty to destroy lives on 
a scale that dwarfs the impact of the tsunami.”178 
There is an even more telling statistic about global poverty and it is an 
enduring one: One-fourth of the developing world—about 1.4 billion 
people—live on the equivalent of less than $1.25 a day.179 Another 1.7 
billion lived on less than $1.45 a day180—at least before the current glob-
al economic crisis.181 Indeed, these proportions have been with us now 
for decades.182 Boring deeper, we find that the 40 percent of humanity 
                                                                                                             
 175. “UNDP is the United Nations’ global development network, an organization ad-
vocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources 
to help people build a better life.” About Us, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], 
http://www.beta.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/about_us.html (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2012). 
 176. A reference to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that killed over 300,000 people, 
leaving millions homeless. 
 177. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1 (2005), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2005/. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, The Developing World is Poorer Than We 
Thought, But No Less Successful in the Fight Against Poverty 30 (Dev. Research Grp., 
World Bank, Working Paper No. 4703, 2008); Isabel Ortiz & Matthew Cummins, Global 
Inequality: Beyond the Bottom Billion—A Rapid Review of Income Distribution in 141 
Countries 11 (U.N. Children’s Fund, Working Paper, 2011), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Global_Inequality_REVISED_-_5_July.pdf; see 
generally GLOBAL INEQUALITY: PATTERNS AND EXPLANATIONS 73–96 (David Held & 
Ayse Kaya eds., 2007). 
 180. Chen & Ravallion, supra note 179, at 30. 
 181. The focus on the persistence of misery understandably falls on so-called develop-
ing societies but the spread of poverty does not stop at the borders of the rich nations. Set 
to Drive 53 Million People Into Poverty in 2009, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Feb. 13, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 29897&Cr= financial &Cr1=crisis; see 
also Martin Ford, Could We Have Civil Unrest and Riots in the U.S. as a Result of Ex-
treme Inequality?, HUFF. POST (July 22, 2011, 12:35 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/martin-ford/could-we-have-civil-unres_b_906478.html. 
 182. See Robert H. Frank, Income Inequality Too Big To Ignore, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.16, 
2010, at BU5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/business/17view.html; 
Anup Shah, Poverty Facts and Stats, GLOBAL ISSUES (Sept. 20, 2010), 
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that lives on less than $2 a day account for only 5 percent of global in-
come, while the richest 10 percent account for 54 percent of global in-
come.183 For less than the amounts we have spent on failed money center 
banks since October 2008 we could have lifted most of those living in 
abject poverty above that $1 threshold.184 Unfortunately, abject poverty 
has never risen to the definition of a crisis under the liberal international-
ist vision.185 Writing about immense suffering in East Bengal, Peter 
Singer said, “the decisions and actions of human beings can prevent this 
kind of suffering. Unfortunately, human beings have not made the neces-
sary decisions.”186 The material cost to the status quo would be too much. 
Furthermore, according to UN: 
Women bear a disproportionate burden of the world’s poverty. Statis-
tics indicate that women are more likely than men to be poor and at risk 
of hunger because of the systematic discrimination they face in educa-
tion, health care, employment[,] and control of assets. Poverty implica-
tions are widespread for women, leaving many without even basic 
rights such as access to clean drinking water, sanitation, medical care 
and decent employment. Being poor can also mean they have little pro-
tection from violence and have no role in decision making.187 
                                                                                                             
www.globalissues.org/article/26/poverty-facts-and-stats; 2011 World Hunger and Pov-
erty Facts and Statistics, WORLD HUNGER EDUC. SERV. (Dec. 4, 2011), 
http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/Learn/world%20hunger%20facts%202002.htm. 
 183. UNDP, 2006 Annual Rep. Global Partnership for Development 8 (June 2006), 
available at http://www.undp.org/publications/annualreport2006/english-report.pdf; see 
Jim Cason, Africa: Nearly Half Sub-Saharan Africa’s Population Live in “Extreme Pov-
erty”, ALLAFRICA (Apr. 29, 2001), http://allafrica.com/stories/200104300001.html. The 
writer quoted a World Bank Report that placed the number of sub-Saharan Africans liv-
ing on less than $1 a day at over 300 million, with expectations that the number will in-
crease by at least 5 million by 2015. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2000/2001: ATTACKING POVERTY 5 (2001). 
 184. G20: Global Bailout Enough to End World Poverty for 50 Years, OXFAM (Apr. 1, 
2009, 3:05 PM), 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/applications/blogs/pressoffice/2009/04/01/g20-global-bank-
bailout-is-enough-to-end-world-poverty-for-50-years/. 
 185. See, e.g., PAUL FARMER, THE USES OF HAITI 45–58 (1994); Pogge, supra note 54, 
at 311. 
 186. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, in 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 229 
(1972). 
 187. Women, Poverty & Economics, U.N. WOMEN, 
http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_poverty_economics (last visited on Jan. 
16, 2012). The report adds that: 
According to some estimates, women represent 70 percent of the world’s poor. 
They are often paid less than men for their work, with the average wage gap in 
2008 being 17 percent. Women face persistent discrimination when they apply 
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According to economist Amartya Sen, women are impacted by perva-
sive discrimination involving a complex combination of socioeconomic 
factors.188 Sen identifies an excess mortality of women in a region rang-
ing from North Africa to Asia, traceable to discrimination in terms of 
medical care, food, and social services.189 He argues that to overcome 
such pervasive discrimination, the economic and social value of women 
should be elevated.190 Education, gainful work outside the home, and 
property rights meaning a greater share of family economic resources are 
essential, according to Sen.191 
2. The MDGs as a Recognition of the Limits of Rights Regimentation in 
the Struggle against Misery 
Faced with the persistence of misery and unwilling to acknowledge the 
brutal reality that power does not concede to the demands of the weak 
even when such demands are wrapped up in legalism, world leaders 
compromised on further deception. MDGs’ September 2000 solution 
featured eight goals and eighteen quantifiable targets to be measured by 
sixty indicators.192 Such precision allows faith to arrest and convict expe-
rience. 
Human rights advocates have long tried to elevate socioeconomic is-
sues to the same stature as civil and political issues in the discourse of 
human rights with very little success.193 The MDGs represent capitula-
tion on this front. The Millennium Declaration marked the abandoning of 
pretences that the socioeconomic provisions of the UDHR and the 
ICESCR could be obtained through the force of law as traditionally con-
ceived.194 Not so, say its promoters.195 Advocates argue that the MDGs 
                                                                                                             
for credit for business or self-employment and are often concentrated in inse-
cure, unsafe[,] and low-wage work. Eight out of ten women workers are con-
sidered to be in vulnerable employment in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, 
with global economic changes taking a huge toll on their livelihoods. 
Id.; see also STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 179 (“According to virtually every indicator 
of social well-being and status . . . women fare significantly and sometimes dramatically 
worse than men.”). 
 188. See Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(Dec. 20, 1990), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1990/dec/20/more-than-100-
million-women-are-missing/. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, supra note 59, at xviii–xix. 
 193. See Pogge, supra note 54, at 311. 
 194. Of course, the UN bureaucracy, among others, tries gamely to obscure this point: 
“Governments that pursue development hand-in-hand with human rights stand a better 
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are consistent with the rights outlined in the UDHR.196 But the approach 
to development contained in the MDGs, couched in the political termi-
nology of goals, recognized the limitations of the rights approach. The 
implications of this shift from rights to goals, as such from law to poli-
tics, should not be glossed over. It is important to recognize when a bat-
tle has been lost. 
The critical move away from the rhetoric of binding obligations is con-
tained in the second paragraph of the Millennium Declaration: 
We recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our in-
dividual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the 
principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As 
leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially 
the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to 
whom the future belongs.197 
The collective responsibility to the world, even when cast as a “duty . . 
. to all the world’s people” is still separate and distinct from their more 
specific and politically ensured national responsibilities.198 The MDGs 
obligations are cut from the same cloth as those stated in the older eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights agreements. Of course, in the hierarchy 
of liberal internationalist discourse, the latter were not in any case the 
Holy Grail of rights. 
Leave it to the UN to finesse the surrender of rights: “[T]he Millenni-
um Development Goals and human rights have ultimately a common 
                                                                                                             
chance of reaching the Millennium Development Goals (‘MDGs’).” Human Rights and 
MDGs in Practice, OHCHR (Aug. 25, 2010), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/HRAndMDGsInPractice.aspx. By incorpo-
rating human rights principles into national development strategies and fulfilling their 
human rights obligations, governments are more likely to be successful in meeting the 
MDGs (to reduce poverty, hunger and disease; promote gender equality, education, envi-
ronmental sustainability; and global partnerships) and in realizing the U.N. Charter’s 
vision of a more equal and just world.” Human Rights are the Basis for Achieving the 
MDGs, OHCHR, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/MDG/Pages/FoundationforEngagement.aspx (last visit-
ed Jan. 23, 2011); see also Salil Shetty: Human Rights Are Key To MDG Success, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/salil-
shetty-human-rights-are-key-mdg-success-2010-09-23. 
 195. See Tarja Halonen, Our Aspirations Must Become Achievements: From the Mil-
lennium Summit to 2015, 44 U.N. CHRON. 10, 10 (2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/chronicle/home/archive/issues2007/themdgsareweon
track/ouraspirationsmustbecomeachievementsfromthemillenniumsummitto2015. 
 196. See Salil Shetty: Human Rights Are Key To MDG Success, supra note 194; Hal-
onen, supra note 195, at 10. 
 197. Millennium Declaration, supra note 28, para. 2. 
 198. Id. 
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objective” in preserving and protecting human dignity.199 The UN recog-
nized that the MDGs “emanate from the political commitments made by 
leaders.”200 The turn to goals was a capitulation to power politics and 
what was seen as the durability, inevitability, and triumph of liberal in-
ternationalism and its neo-liberal economic policies. The MDGs were 
adopted at a time when economic globalization was generating substan-
tial wealth without significant impact on the portion of the world existing 
in abject poverty.201 In that context, it may have been expedient to gain 
political support for sustained global efforts to tackle misery by reducing 
the legal content of demands by have-nots on the haves. As the UN has 
acknowledged, “human rights have not yet played a significant role in 
supporting and influencing MDG-related activities . . . . Some voices 
have criticized the MDGs themselves, questioning whether human rights 
standards have been lowered.”202 It is actually a positive development 
that the UN was forced to defend its MDGs approach by admitting “the 
harsh reality . . . that in spite of the best human rights norms and laws, 
mass poverty and deprivation continue to plague the world.”203 
Unfortunately, judged from its mid-point achievements, the MDGs and 
their concession to realism have fared no better.204 The international hu-
man rights and development network now claims, more than a decade 
into the MDGs initiative, that the large disparities that continue within 
and across countries constitute an emergency.205 Development emergen-
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cies have long plagued the world. There is very little evidence to suggest 
that the explicitly political approach of the MDGs will fare any better 
than the legal regimentation of the UDHR and its progenies. However, 
the current global economic crisis will likely weaken political commit-
ments to the MDGs even as it confirms the realities of extreme inequali-
ties built on a vast power differential in the global community.206 
The ongoing global financial and economic crises will undoubtedly re-
duce the commitment and capacity of wealthy nations to the MDGs.207 
Poorer nations are likely to sink further down the poverty ladder. It now 
seems highly unlikely that the modest goals of the MDGs will be met by 
2015.208 Furthermore, the failure of the MDG campaign is unlikely to 
result in a reinvigorated economic and social rights movement. The na-
tions of the “developed world” are now too busy staving off a seemingly 
unending economic crisis, spending trillions globally just to preserve the 
current economic model.209 With advanced developing countries like 
China, Brazil, and India desperately holding onto their recent gains,210 
they too are not likely to champion a revived rights based approach to 
promoting human dignity in the economic and social sphere. In fact, 
many of these advanced developing countries are engaged in economic 
and trade relations with their less well-off counterparts in the developing 
world that appear to repeat the history of inequality and exploitation.211 
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III. WHY THE UDHR FAILED AS A LIBERAL INTERNATIONALIST 
ENTERPRISE  
The central liberal internationalist premise is the value of a rules-based 
international order that restrains powerful states and thereby reassures 
their enemies and allies alike and allows weaker states to have suffi-
cient voice in the system that they will not choose to exit.212 
In its essence, liberal internationalism represents the idea that “the 
cause of the United States [or of the Western world] is the cause of hu-
manity.”213 Quite often, it takes the form that the United States is the last 
best hope of humanity and the world demands America’s leadership. In 
this vein, this Article describes the UDHR as a liberal internationalist 
project. This characterization might offend proponents of the UDHR who 
could interpret it as a normative evaluation. However, the liberal interna-
tionalist heritage of the UDHR should not of itself affect an assessment 
of its contributions to human dignity and prosperity. To the degree that 
this heritage interferes with or negates efforts to tackle the reality of hu-
man violence and misery, it should be faulted and exposed. 
The development of human rights as the preferred plane of contention 
was a critical move in support of liberal internationalist efforts to main-
tain power and constrain the development of post war challenges to its 
preeminence.214 The rhetoric of rights was thus employed in service of 
politics or politics by other means.215 However, hidden within the soft 
soporific rhetoric of rights rooted in the law was a tough concerted polit-
ical struggle to maintain Western influence and dominance.216 The adop-
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tion of the MDGs framework has helped to remove the mask of rights 
and to free post-World War II politics from its liberal internationalist 
straight-jacket. 
Why has the rights regimentation project of liberal internationalism 
failed so comprehensively? In this section, this Article places the UDHR 
and post-World War II human rights discourse squarely within the spe-
cific dynamic struggle for power and dominance in the post-war envi-
ronment and the much broader context of power struggles throughout 
human history. This Article rejects the liberal internationalist narratives 
that tell us basically that this time is different, that society has made or is 
in the process of making the world anew. 
In developing this argument, this Article specifically challenges Pro-
fessor Glendon’s interpretation of the Melian Dialogue217 to support the 
contributions and purposes of the UDHR. The era of rights regimentation 
has not represented a fundamental break from our collective horrid 
past—from Athenian power politics or history in general. There is no end 
to history in sight. Rights discourse and regimentation have not and can-
not be the foundation for ending violence and misery in our world. A less 
sentimental perspective would locate the UDHR and its progenies, as 
well as the MDGs initiative, within the ongoing serious and often deadly 
business of global political struggles for power and domination. While 
the rhetoric of rights might be of tactical aid to some in this struggle, it is 
not salvation. This understanding is essential to the work that needs to be 
done to make sustained improvement to the lives of the most vulnerable 
human beings. First comes power. Power rules. Power begets rights (or 
privileges), however defined. It does not help those at the bottom of 
global society to suggest that the rules of global human interactions 
changed fundamentally in the 1940s when they clearly have not. 
A. A World Made New? Liberal Internationalist Dreaming 
When the Athenian Navy was poised to invade tiny Melos in 416 B.C., 
the terrified islanders sent emissaries to try to reason with the masters 
of the sea. The Athenians’ scornful rebuff has echoed down the centu-
ries: “You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only 
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in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can 
and the weak suffer what they must.” 
History has provided plenty of support for that brutal dictum, from the 
enslavement and the massacre of the Melians to the present day. Yet, 
centuries later, in the wake of atrocities beyond Greek imagining, the 
mightiest nations on earth bowed to the demands of smaller countries 
for recognition of a common standard by which rights and wrongs of 
every nations’s behavior could be measured. The moral terrain of inter-
national relations was forever altered . . . when the United Nations 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without a single 
dissenting vote.218 
A World Made New, Professor Mary Ann Glendon’s seminal work on 
the UDHR presents a classic liberal internationalist accounting of the 
human rights project even as it seeks to respond to some of the familiar 
criticisms of this perspective. Professor Glendon builds her work around 
two major themes: (1) that the UDHR was the product of a historical 
process that saw the desires and demands of the weak (poor people with-
in countries and weaker states in the international community) triumph 
over the interests and concerns of the powerful, and (2) that the UDHR 
was the product of a diverse group of individuals who, by and large went 
outside the scope of their official mandates to produce a unifying charter 
for humanity.219 The first represents a substantive rationale for the liberal 
internationalist project while the second speaks to the process of legiti-
mization. Professor Glendon is wrong on both counts. 
Glendon begins by positing the UDHR as a concession by the great 
powers in the immediate post-World War II period (the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom) to demands by the much 
larger group of weaker nations for a common universal standard to judge 
state behavior domestically as well as internationally.220 In her interpreta-
tion, the UDHR “marked a new chapter in a history that began with the 
great charters of humanity’s first rights moment in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.”221 She argues that the UDHR was a triumph of 
ideals from the bottom up: from eager weaker nations to reluctant major 
powers, and from the masses of humanity to the governments of the 
world.222 Even when she concedes that the “United States and the Soviet 
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Union could not resist treating the Declaration as an arsenal of political 
weapons,”223 she does so to serve this narrative of the good future tri-
umphing over the bad past. 
A World Made New also presents the UDHR as a compromise reached 
by a diverse group of international actors who, while serving as official 
representatives of their nations, somehow also embodied the historic 
common concerns of humanity.224 In particular, Glendon focuses on the 
extraordinary leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, who was tasked by Presi-
dent Truman after the death of President Roosevelt, to lead United States 
efforts to create the world’s first comprehensive human rights docu-
ment.225 Glendon portrays her in essence as the leader of a small but di-
verse band of humanitarians who may be dubbed “internationalistas.”226 
In her account, these representatives of the cosmopolitan elite led a battle 
to salvage the hopes of humanity from the dark past of power politics.227 
Glendon’s work is an important chronicle of the contributions of di-
verse extraordinary individuals under the leadership of a truly unique 
woman. These dedicated persons strived to address vital questions of 
how human relate to each other and why we have so readily perpetrated 
atrocities and tolerated misery in our midst.228 However, the work did not 
do sufficient justice to the centrality of Western influences in the process 
and to the fundamental constraints and weaknesses of the whole enter-
prise. In brief, Eleanor Roosevelt and the other able negotiators and 
drafters had to work within parameters of cosmopolitan tinkering pre-
scribed by the governments that sent them to the conference.229 Their 
final product had to meet the interests and expectations of their respec-
tive governments.230 
The constraints upon the delegates were especially significant as for all 
practical purposes the Cold War between East and West had begun and 
the schism was rapidly growing.231 Recall Winston Churchill’s famed 
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1946 “Iron Curtain” speech in which he cast the Anglo-American alli-
ance as the foundation for liberty.232 That speech elicited a sharp re-
sponse from the Soviet Union and marked a wholesale return to the 
past.233 Indeed, it should not be forgotten that the Berlin blockade was 
occurring even as the UDHR was being adopted and that apartheid in 
South Africa was officially established in 1948, the year of the UDHR’s 
adoption.234 These events alone should clue us as to the place of the 
rights enterprise within the whole schema of ongoing and rapidly deterio-
rating global power and politics. The point is not only that one side of the 
East-West divide never bought into the rhetoric of legally-mediated 
rights, but that even those that committed to advancing such a vision had 
a more important war to fight and win. 
Glendon’s work also emphasizes the diverse background of key play-
ers in the drafting of the UDHR in order to make the case that the results 
of the process legitimately represented the perspectives and interests of 
humanity as a whole.235 She brings to light critical advocacy and leader-
ship roles played by delegates from less powerful Western countries like 
Australia and Canada, as well as emerging Third World countries such as 
Lebanon and the Philippines.236 This perspective is not unimportant, yet 
should only be taken so far. These individuals represented important and 
legitimate perspectives but it must be understood that their advocacy was 
in the service of political positions and interests within their communi-
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ties. These individuals were engaged in promoting political visions that 
were by no means uncontested. Their interests were aligned with the lib-
eral internationalist vision and adopting the rhetoric of rights was only 
the beginning of their struggles for influence and power.237 It cannot be a 
surprise that once in power, many of those who had employed rights 
rhetoric and processes to gain power held on with vengeance and had 
little difficulty practicing violence or ignoring misery.238 They did not 
buy their own rhetoric. That was left to those outside trying to get in. 
Glendon’s narrative serves an important function in liberal internation-
alist advocacy. Its principal objective is to make the Western perspective 
the global cause as if ordained by nature or god. As her text demon-
strates, the UDHR was a Western initiative.239 To be more accurate, it 
was a Western cosmopolitan initiative that was promoted by people, not 
all of whom Westerners by birth but certainly were so by heritage or in-
terests.240 This is not to suggest that the ideas or the vision projected by 
the UDHR were uniformly approved in all quarters of Western society or 
categorically dismissed outside Western society. Nor does this suggest 
that its origin in liberal internationalism should disqualify the document 
and its progenies from being accepted as a worthy enterprise or accom-
plishment of humanity. 
It is necessary to recognize and appreciate its origins as ideology in or-
der to better explain both its promise and limitations.241 By recognizing 
the UDHR as emanating principally from liberal internationalist imagina-
tion, we could, for example, choose to do the hard work of explaining 
that if we are to realize many of its substantive goals, some of the mate-
rial privileges of Western society may have to be reduced. Or recogniz-
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ing its deeply political past might allow those who still care about its 
substantive goals sufficient flexibility to build common cause with oth-
ers. We are not talking about religious faith here. We are engaged in po-
litical struggles, hoping for concrete outcomes that could move the lot of 
the least of us from perpetual and terrifying misery into tolerable subsist-
ence. 
B. Same Old World: The Limits of Liberal Internationalism 
Athenians: “[W]e recommend that you should try to get what is possi-
ble for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really think; 
since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed 
by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of 
power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the pow-
er to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” 
Melians: “Then in our view (since you force us to leave justice out of 
account and to confine ourselves to self-interest)—in our view it is at 
any rate useful that you should not destroy a principle that is to the 
general good of all men—namely . . . fair play and just dealing.” 
Athenians: “What we shall do now is to show you that it is for the good 
of our own empire that we are here.” 
Melians: “And how could it be just as good for us to be the slaves as 
for you to be the masters?” 
Athenians: “You, by giving in, would save yourselves from disaster; 
we, by not destroying you, would be able to profit from you.” 
Melians: “So you would not agree to our being neutral, friends instead 
of enemies?” 
Athenians: “No, because it is not so much your hostility that injures us; 
it is rather the case that, if we were on friendly terms with you, our sub-
jects would regard that as a sign of weakness in us, whereas your hatred 
is evidence of our power.”242 
1948 did not change history. The fundamental lessons of the “Melian 
Dialogue” remain unaltered by time or human experience. Professor 
Glendon’s interpretation of the core role of the UDHR does not account 
for its intimate connections to overarching political struggles for power 
and influence and the imperatives of hegemony.243 If law is thought of as 
settled or concretized politics, then the creation of the UDHR in the af-
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termath of World War II was a continuation of politics by other means; 
an effort to settle politics at a point of maximum advantage to Western 
interests. More specifically, the development of the UDHR allowed pro-
ponents at that crucial moment in world history, to try to restructure the 
terrain of political conflict and ensure hegemony. Undoubtedly, they 
were interested in reducing the prospects of future wars, especially of the 
all-consuming globalized carnage variety they had just witnessed. Yet 
still, they sought to do this by selling a vision of a post war social order 
that would limit the unpredictability of raw power politics. They turned 
to the idea of law. The UDHR was a component of this strategy. Re-
course to law and legal processes as they conceived it could indeed help 
to settle some outstanding and emerging disputes. However, and more 
importantly, it could remove many others from active challenges, espe-
cially by newer actors on the world stage.244 This could be seen as an 
effort to manage complexity—gradually adjusting the international order 
to deal with the challenges posed by decolonization and the spread of 
communism.245 
This turn to law already had a long history in American international 
relations. President Theodore Roosevelt promoted global governance 
after his excursion in Cuba and presidency.246 President Woodrow Wil-
son labored with mixed success to recreate a world order around the 
short-lived League of Nations, the unfortunately named Permanent Court 
of Justice, and the more enduring International Labor Organization.247 
The successful conclusion of World War II and the resulting relative su-
periority of American power provided impetus for a return to this Wilso-
nian impulse.248 The UDHR was only one of many “Wilsonian” or “Roo-
seveltian” international social order initiatives.249 The Nuremberg trials, 
the Genocide Convention, the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
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GATT are other prominent examples of initiatives to manage complexi-
ty, restrain challenges, and maintain western superiority.250 
The language of law, including the promotion of legal standards and 
the creation of legal structures, was sold as essential to prevent future 
destructive conflicts within and across national boundaries. The Chinese 
revolution of 1949 and the Cuban revolution of 1959 epitomized the sort 
of change that was alarming and disfavored.251 Transforming a raw and 
dynamic political order convulsing with brutal violence into a more sta-
ble legal order was clearly in the interests of the United States and its 
allies.252 For one thing, it ratified the conduct and outcome of the war 
that had been conducted with exceptional brutality.253 For another, it 
would confirm their superior position in the emerging post war political 
order. Law helped to coat the Western world’s actions and policies with 
timeless righteousness. 
This move toward international legal regimentation also had the added 
benefit of reinterpreting history, bringing to fore not necessarily specific 
aspects of the past (whether slavery, colonization, Manifest Destiny, or 
imperialism), but the generalized antiseptic idea of the West as a league 
nurtured and guided by the ideals founded in documents such as the 
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Magna Carta, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, the American 
Declaration of Independence, and the United States Constitution.254 
This idea of law also paved a very narrow and bounded pathway to the 
future, limiting possibilities for changing the new post-war international 
order. The rhetoric of law as the acceptable path through the post war 
environment—a future where conflicts would be mediated by objective 
international legal standards rather than recourse to war—was also at-
tractive to some outside the West.255 Some leaders of relatively weaker 
nations and many seeking emancipation from foreign domination, in-
cluding some not aligned with the United States, saw possibilities of a 
better deal in a world with clearer international structures and more bind-
ing rules of operation.256 They attached themselves to the rhetoric.257 
The principal adversaries of the West, the Soviet Union and China, in-
terpreted the turn to law as fundamentally the continuation of power poli-
tics by other means and they acted accordingly.258 They could not have 
shared Glendon’s optimism. Interestingly, some in Britain, the United 
States’ main ally, saw the promotion of law in this context as soft-headed 
but could not afford sharp differences with the United States.259 
Left to the whims and caprices of governments, politicians, bureau-
crats, as well as emerging multinational corporate interests, the UDHR 
would not likely have attained any significant mark in human affairs. 
Governments and their functionaries understood its limits and made sure 
that it was not a legally binding document under international law by 
adopting it as a declaration.260 The multinational corporations ranging the 
world in constant search for commodities that fueled the comfort of the 
emerging post-war middle class, couldn’t care less.261 Indeed, the reality 
                                                                                                             
 254. See HELEN JACKSON ET AL., A CENTURY OF DISHONOR: A SKETCH OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT’S DEALINGS WITH SOME OF THE INDIAN TRIBES, at v (1994) (refer-
ring to the “sad story” of American treatment of Native Americans); CHALMERS 
JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE 2–9 (2004) (discussing a “new American empire” 
built on military “expropriation of . . . valuable land for bases, extraterritorial status for . . 
. troops who commit[] crimes,” amongst others); PAKENHAM, supra note 47, at 15; HUGH 
THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE (1997); TRAXEL, supra note 248, at 319–19. 
 255. See GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW, supra note 13, at 235–41. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. They employed the rhetoric of law and rights as they crushed dissent at home and 
within their spheres of influence. See Kim, supra note 64, at 356–64. 
 259. Winston S. Churchill, The Council of Europe Address (Aug. 17, 1949). 
 260. Many legal scholars argue that the UDHR as a whole or at least some of its provi-
sions have attained the force of law as part of customary international law. See, e.g., 
STEINER ET AL., supra note 8, at 137. 
 261. Anderson, supra note 124, at 468–70; Redford & Stephens, supra note 129, at 
433–62. 
456 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:2 
of the immediate aftermath of the UDHR was a world filled with escalat-
ing violence, tempered only by the lofty rhetoric of the time.262 
Perhaps the fact that much of the evil of what was happening was seen 
primarily in the context of the Manichean struggle between good and 
evil, allowed for the sort of revisionist conclusions offered by Professor 
Glendon. Conceivably, the Cold War provided a pass since those in-
volved were only sort of temporarily deviating from past and future 
goodness. 
It was left largely to civil society to claim and reclaim the vision of the 
UDHR and to attempt to force feed some substance and truth into its thin 
outlines. Over the decades, some have pursued its signal purpose to put 
the dignity and welfare of humanity at the core of the business of gov-
ernments.263 Their work and their wailings have served to give testament 
to the harsh reality of human existence. While important and necessary, 
their struggles do not constitute progress if the goal was to change things 
fundamentally for the better. 
Whatever measure of success they may claim has been in areas far 
from those who most need the promises of the UDHR and its progenies. 
The numerous covenants, conventions, treaties, agreements, protocols, 
resolutions, and other similar indicia of accomplishments by lawyers and 
diplomats and activists have not prevented recurring genocide, crimes 
against humanity, ethnic cleansing, widespread torture, famine, traffick-
ing, and the like from happening. A world of abject poverty, millions of 
people dying from preventable ills, environmental exploitation and de-
struction, and unfettered violence remain a well-tolerated part of our 
global order.264 This is the real legacy of the liberal international sales 
job. 
CONCLUSION  
Finally, in many contexts, transforming a harm into a “human rights 
violation” may be a way of condoning or denying rather than naming 
and  condemning it. A terrible set of events occurs in Bosnia. We could 
think of it as sin and send in the religious, as illness and send physi-
cians, as politics and send the politicians, as war and send the military. 
Or we could think of it as a human rights violation and send the law-
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yers. Doing so can be a way of doing nothing, avoiding responsibility, 
simultaneously individualizing the harm and denying its specificity.265 
To rely on the suggestions of sentiment rather than on the commands of 
reason is to think of powerful people gradually ceasing to oppress oth-
ers,  or ceasing to countenance the oppression of others, out of mere 
niceness rather than out of obedience to the moral law. But it is revolt-
ing to think  that our only hope for a decent society consists in soften-
ing the self-satisfied hearts of a leisure class. We want moral progress 
to burst up  from below, rather than waiting patiently upon conde-
scension from the top.266 
Professor Kennedy’s observations about the role of lawyers and rights 
discourse points to an understanding of how to help without constraining 
or foreclosing other possibilities.267 Law does not and should not have 
hegemony as society seeks to deal with the harsh realities of power—
how it is accumulated and wielded—across many tangents, in varieties of 
forms and processes. It is important to recognize the limits of ideological 
or other faith based efforts that could easily be manipulated to protect the 
status quo even when the result is unrelenting violence and misery. 
Professor Rorty’s suggestion of a politics of pragmatic and purposeful 
sentimentality over pure reason appears to be a weaker strategy given the 
enormity of the problems we face. However, it has the virtue of honesty 
compared to the salvation preached by rights evangelists. It may well be 
that Melians properly chose not to be enslaved by the Athenians. Yet, 
their appeal to reason was not an answer to disproportionate power. 
Our choices today should not be reduced to either an acceptance of the 
status quo of misery and violence or a pursuit of the Holy Grail of rights 
regimentation. Even an appeal to sentiments leaves open possibilities not 
yet apparent to us. 
The situation is dire. The UDHR as a post-World War II liberal inter-
nationalist project chronicled human suffering and the timeless struggle 
to defend human dignity and change the course of history. However, the 
UDHR rights-based approach has helped to obscure the intimate connec-
tions between power, violence, and human rights discourse. It has failed 
to adequately provide a way to reduce global inequality and resulting 
human suffering. It has allowed many to pay lip service as the world con-
tinues to sink further into the abyss. The more recent, politically-based 
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MDGs approach confirmed the failure of the rights project but it too has 
not offered a path out of misery and endemic. The bottom fifth of hu-
manity persist in miserable subsistence, millions continue to traverse the 
seas and deserts of our globe unwilling to suffer and die quietly, even as 
thousands of children perish quietly everyday of deprivation. Yet the 
world continues to tinker around the edges of despair. 
The era of rights—rights discourse and rights regimes—ushered by the 
UDHR helped us to define the problem and the challenges. But that era’s 
fundamental weakness was contained in its foundational purpose—to 
preserve the core vision and material advantages of liberal international-
ists. Rights discourse was an important tool in this endeavor but rights-
realization was not its end. Now as the seductive power of rights regi-
mentation is exhausted, the world community must confront the tough 
political choices that are necessary in order to reduce the power differen-
tials that have sustained global inequality within and across borders. As 
the decades roll on and the UDHR and similar documents of the era are 
brought out for periodic veneration, society could take some comfort in 
the fact that their ideals have continued to find resonance among the op-
pressed. These documents, however, by and large remind us of what 
could have been and the enormity of the challenges still facing humanity. 
Our world was not made new in 1948. It remains still a world of violence 
and misery. 
 
